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Abstract: 
In this article I argue that urbanization should be understood as a global historical process driven 
primarily by population dynamics stimulated by technological and institutional change. In 
particular, disease control and expanded access to surplus energy supplies are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for urbanization to occur given historical evidence of an inherent human 
propensity to agglomerate. Economic development, which has traditionally been viewed as the 
primary driving force behind urbanization, can accelerate the process but is not a necessary 
condition for it to occur. Informed by this historically-grounded theory of urbanization, a range of 
qualitative and quantitative evidence is used to explain the stylized facts of sub-Saharan Africa’s 
urban transition, namely the late onset of urbanization in Africa vis-à-vis other major world 
regions, the widely noted but inadequately explained phenomenon of ‘urbanization without growth’ 
observed in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, and the historically unprecedented rates of urban 
population growth seen in the region throughout the late twentieth century. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The process of urbanization has traditionally been understood as a by-product of economic 
development. However, this theoretical perspective does not provide an adequate explanation for 
the striking universality of the process, the differential timing of urbanization across countries and 
regions, the phenomenon of ‘urbanization without growth’ observed in Africa in the 1980s and 
1990s, nor the historically unprecedented rates of urban population growth seen in the region 
throughout the post-war era (see Table 1). Consequently, a more nuanced theory of the process is 
necessary to explain the dynamics of Africa’s urban transition. 
 
Table 1 Demographic and economic trends by region, 1960-2005 
 1960  1960-2005 
 
Level of 
urbanization  
Urban 
growth 
rate 
Urbanization 
rate 
GDP 
growth rate 
Population 
growth rate 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 14.75  4.59 1.92 0.59 2.68 
East Asia & 
Pacific 16.75  3.66 2.02 5.03 1.64 
South Asia 16.56  3.35 1.21 2.47 2.14 
Middle East & 
North Africa 33.97  3.69 1.13 - 2.56 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 49.02  3.10 1.02 1.58 2.08 
Notes: Calculated based on data from World Bank World Development Indicators Database, accessed 
September, 2010. GDP growth rate estimates based on real GDP per capita (constant 2000 $US) 
 
 
In this article I argue that urbanization should be understood as a global historical process driven 
primarily by population dynamics stimulated by technological and institutional change. While 
urban settlements emerged in many regions prior to the 19th century, the proportion of the global 
population residing in urban settlements remained limited. Historical research indicates that urban 
population growth in the pre-industrial era was ultimately restricted by two factors: 1) the 
oavailability of surplus energy supplies (i.e. food and fuels) to support a non-agricultural 
population, and 2) the burden of infectious and parasitic diseases, which thrive in densely populated 
settlements. In other words, limited surplus energy supplies and high disease burdens (and hence 
high urban mortality rates) placed a natural ‘ceiling’ on urban population growth and hence 
urbanization. However, technological and institutional changes in 18th and 19th centuries alleviated 
these constraints and set the inexorable process of world urbanization in motion, first in Europe and 
subsequently in other regions as key innovations were diffused through trade and conquest. 
Crucially, many of these changes contributed to both mortality decline (and hence population 
growth) and economic development (defined as a structural shift in output away from agriculture 
and towards industry and services) leading to the spurious conclusion that economic development is 
the motive force behind urbanization. While there is no question that structural shifts in labour 
markets contribute to rural-urban migration, the historical record indicates that it is ultimately rapid 
population growth, stimulated by mortality decline and sustained by improved access to surplus 
energy supplies, that underpins the urbanization process. 
 
    Applying this theory to the African case, the late onset of Africa’s urban transition can be 
attributed to natural geographic endowments that rendered the local production and acquisition 
(through trade) of surplus energy supplies, as well as disease control, uniquely difficult in the 
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region. The rapid pace of urban growth in Africa since 1960 is explained by the application of 
technologies and the consolidation of modern institutions introduced through colonialism and trade, 
which facilitated a secular3 decline in mortality rates as well as improved access to surplus food 
supplies, partly through productivity improvements but mostly through imports and international 
aid. Countries that have experienced more rapid economic and demographic growth have urbanized 
more quickly in the post-war era, but the absence of economic growth has not been sufficient to 
arrest urban growth wherever mortality has continued to fall and sufficient surplus food supplies 
have remained available. In sum, the seemingly unique characteristics of Africa’s urban transition 
are explicable within the framework of the theory of urbanization proposed here.  
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section two provides a critical literature review 
and outlines a theory of urbanization integrating demographic, economic and historical 
perspectives. Section three applies this theory to urbanization trends in Africa in the pre-colonial 
and colonial era, providing some statistical evidence that natural geographic endowments have 
influenced the timing of urbanization across countries, as well as evidence that variation in colonial 
experience—a key mechanism of technological and institutional change in the region—is associated 
with differential urban trajectories. Section four considers the unique dynamics of urbanization and 
urban growth in Africa in the post-colonial era and demonstrates empirically that these are 
accounted for once historical circumstances and population dynamics are taken into account. 
Section five concludes with a comment on the policy implications of the theory and evidence 
presented. 
 
 
Theorizing the urban transition 
The standard body of literature on urbanization is divided between economic and demographic 
theories of the process and there has been surprisingly little cross-pollination between the two. 
Generally speaking, economists mostly direct their attention to explaining variation in levels and 
rates of urbanization across countries (i.e. the relative balance between rural and urban populations 
within a country) while demographers have almost exclusively focused on the determinants of 
urban growth rates (i.e. absolute change in the size of urban populations). Despite this difference, 
both bodies of work offer useful insights into the contemporary dynamics of the process.  
 
    However, neither provides an adequate explanation for the universality of the urban transition, 
nor the geographic and temporal variation of its onset. After reviewing the standard economic and 
demographic literature, I turn to historical accounts of the first phase of world urbanization, which 
helps to bring the underlying mechanisms driving world urbanization more clearly into focus. 
Finally, I present a stylized model of urbanization that integrates these three perspectives. 
 
Economic and demographic theories of urbanization and urban growth 
Economic theories of urbanization revolve around the relationship between structural economic 
change and the spatial dynamics of the labour market. The basic premise underpinning these 
theories is straightforward: as the ‘modern’ urban sector expands (i.e. manufacturing, industry and 
services) surplus labour from the ‘backward’ rural economy (i.e. agriculture) is ‘pulled’ into towns 
and cities. The basic parameters of this ‘dual economy’ theory of urbanization were first proposed 
by Lewis (1954) and subsequently formalized by Fei and Ranis (1964). In brief, the formal model 
identifies rural-to-urban migration as the causal mechanism linking economic change to 
urbanization, and migration is assumed to be driven by a wage gap that arises between rural and 
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urban areas in the ‘take-off’ stage of economic development. Over time, the urban labour market 
becomes saturated, surplus labour in rural areas is exhausted and the wage gap is eliminated.4 
 
Decades of cross-country empirical studies provide considerable support for the basic premise that 
economic development drives urbanization, consistently demonstrating that levels of urbanization 
are highly correlated with levels of income per capita and with the structural characteristics of 
economies. However, as early as the 1950s it was recognized that rates of urbanization in many 
developing countries were incommensurate with the growth of waged employment opportunities in 
urban areas, resulting in under- and unemployment—a phenomenon dubbed ‘over-urbanization’ 
(Davis and Golden 1954).     
 
To explain this deviation from the classic model, and the implied failure of the market to allocate 
labour efficiently between rural and urban areas, Haris and Todaro (1970) proposed a revised model 
in which migration decisions are influenced by expected as opposed to actual earnings in the urban 
sector. In contexts where urban wages exceed the ‘natural’ market price due to inflated government 
salaries and minimum wage legislation, migration incentives are distorted upwards leading to 
excessive migration. In other words, ‘over-urbanization’ is explained in the Haris-Todaro model 
(HTM) as a consequence of wage-distorting government intervention in the labour market. In such 
contexts the model suggests that wage-equalization or mobility restriction policies will lead to net 
welfare improvements. 
    
Empirical tests of the wage-differential mechanism assumed in both the classic dual economy 
model and the revised HTM have produced ambiguous results, explaining only a small fraction of 
the variation in rates of urbanization across countries (see Mazumdar 1987, Weeks 1995, Becker 
and Morrison 1995, Fay and Opal 2000, Lall, Selod and Shalizi 2006). This may reflect the failure 
of standard economic models to account for the role of the urban informal sector (the ‘third sector’), 
which is where most migrants (especially in Africa) end up. As Bhattacharya observes, ‘once a 
dynamic and productive Informal sector is introduced into the analysis, the unemployment 
consequences of rural-urban migration on which so much attention has been devoted appear to be 
exaggerated’ (1993, 244).5 Weak evidence in support of the wage-differential hypothesis is also 
surely a consequence of economists’ narrow focus on economic incentives for migration. A large 
body of qualitative and quantitative studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s identified myriad 
non-economic motives for migration, such as the desire of youth to escape the control of older 
generations; of women to escape gender discrimination, join husbands in town or take advantage of 
the ‘thick’ market for spouses in urban areas; and of others to acquire the social prestige associated 
with urban life or pursue their dreams in the ‘bright lights’ of the big city (see Byerlee 1974, 
Mazumdar 1987, Becker and Morrison 1995). More recent studies have explored the impacts of 
ethnic conflict, war and climatic variation in spurring forced migration to urban areas (Fay and Opal 
2000, Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl 2006). Given the many reasons people leave the countryside for 
the city it is not surprising that empirical studies have failed to confirm the primacy of the wage-
differential mechanism. 
 
In sum, both theory and evidence suggest that urbanization is ‘driven’ by economic development 
and that the general mechanism linking the two is rural-to-urban migration. But the pace of 
urbanization is only partially explained by income growth and wage gaps between rural and urban 
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technological improvement.  
5
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areas, indicating that standard economic theories are incomplete. In other words, economic 
development appears to be a sufficient but unnecessary condition for urbanization to occur. Indeed, 
in an empirical study explicitly designed to solve the paradox of ‘urbanization without growth’ in 
sub-Saharan Africa throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Fay and Opal (2000) note that in many 
regions—not just Africa—‘urbanization continues even during periods of negative [economic] 
growth, carried by its own momentum’ (25). The only explanation the authors provide for this 
momentum is a vague speculation that external forces (namely globalization) may be at work. 
Somewhat surprisingly, their study did not consider population dynamics. 
 
Traditional demographic accounts of the urban transition depart from the premise that urban 
population growth has three proximate causes: 1) natural increase, 2) in-migration and 3) 
reclassification (Cohen 2003). Although significant from a statistical methodology point of view, 
reclassification cannot logically be a contributing factor to urban growth in any absolute sense, so 
the focus here is on the first two.6 
 
Demographers attribute changes in urban natural increase and rural-urban migration to population 
dynamics associated with the demographic transition (DT). In brief, the DT involves a secular 
decline in mortality rates followed by a secular decline in fertility rates, shifting a population from a 
wasteful cycle of reproduction in which many babies are born but the majority die before reaching 
adulthood to an efficient cycle in which fewer babies are born but most survive. Importantly, this 
transition is everywhere associated with a period of rapid population expansion due to the fact that 
mortality decline precedes fertility decline, creating a substantial window of time in which births far 
exceed deaths in a population.  
 
In relation to urban growth, the onset of mortality decline ahead of fertility decline in urban areas 
raises the rate of urban natural increase and urban populations expand, regardless of whether or not 
they are net recipients of rural migrants. Theoretically urbanization could occur in a population 
without rural-to-urban migration if urban natural increase were to exceed rural natural increase over 
a sustained period, but in reality this has rarely happened.7 With regards to the relationship between 
population growth and migration it has long been assumed among demographers of a Malthusian 
persuasion that rapid population growth in rural areas contributes to the ‘push’ factors that drive 
people into cities as population pressure strains natural resources (such as land and water) resulting 
in declining living standards and rural misery (Preston 1979, Kelley and Williamson 1984). It is 
also worth noting that the early stages of the DT are associated with a ‘youth bulge’—i.e. an 
increase in the proportion of a population ages 15-24—which may raise migration rates given that 
youth have a substantially higher propensity to migrate than older individuals. 
 
There is ample empirical evidence that mortality decline, and the acceleration in population growth 
that follows, is an important driver of urban population growth. For example, Preston (1979) 
demonstrated a strong one-to-one correlation between total population growth and urban growth, 
and many studies have noted that urban natural increase generally contributes more to overall urban 
population growth than rural-to-urban migration does, although the relative contributions of each 
tend to shift as a country urbanizes with natural increase playing an increasingly important role (e.g. 
Davis 1965, Preston 1979, Cohen 2003, Lall, Selod and Shalizi 2006). By contrast, cross-country 
evidence on the broader relationships between mortality decline, population growth and 
urbanization is virtually non-existent—a surprising omission from the demographic literature.8 
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Whether or not the onset of the demographic transition is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for 
the urban transition to occur is difficult to deduce from the existing cross-country research. 
Hypothetically, urbanization and urban growth could occur solely through rural-to-urban migration 
in a context of static population growth and rapid economic growth. Conversely, if the Malthusians 
are right, rapid urbanization in Africa in a context of economic stagnation might be explained by 
exceptionally rapid population growth in the region—a possibility that has never been empirically 
tested. A relative dearth of evidence leaves the question of demographic causation unresolved in the 
standard literature. However, there is a small but compelling body of historical demographic 
research that provides support for the view that the onset of the demographic transition is a 
necessary and possibly sufficient condition for urbanization to occur.  
 
Historical perspectives on urbanization and urban growth 
Abstracting from historical accounts detailing the emergence, growth and decline of cities across 
the world over the past 6000 years, two key theoretical insights can be gleaned concerning the 
underlying causes of the global urban transition and the variable timing of its onset across regions. 
Both insights relate to the question of why the proportion of the world’s urban population remained 
roughly constant for thousands of years, hovering around 5%, before suddenly expanding at a 
breakneck pace from the late 19th century (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: World population & urbanization, 1000 AD – 2000 AD 
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Sources: Population estimates from Maddison (2009); urbanization 
estimates from Grauman (1977) and (United Nations 2008a) 
 
 
The answer provided by historical demographers is that cities were deadly places to live until 
recently. Prior to the 19th century, urban settlements with rudimentary water and sanitation 
infrastructure were uniquely conducive to the spread of infectious and parasitic diseases. As a 
consequence, death rates tended to exceed birth rates rendering cities ‘demographic sinks’ (Graunt 
1662/1964, de Vries 1984, Bairoch 1988, Lowry 1990, Dyson 2010b). With negative rates of 
natural increase, urban settlements everywhere depended upon a constant inflow of rural migrants 
to sustain their populations.  
 
This is a crucial observation. The fact that cities formed and grew despite consuming more people 
than they were capable of producing indicates that a constant flow of rural migrants was necessary 
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for cities to exist for any length of time. In turn, this suggests that the impulse to migrate has been a 
perennial feature of human behavior for as long as cities have existed—even when migrants stood 
to suffer from higher rates of morbidity and mortality than they would have in the countryside. The 
important implication is that any realistic model of the urban transition should assume some 
constant rate of rural-to-urban migration, all other things being equal. 
 
This ‘disease-constraint’ theory also brings the specific mechanism linking the demographic 
transition to urbanization more clearly into focus by identifying mortality decline stimulated by 
disease control as the demographic dynamic of greatest causal significance. Where the burden of 
disease is eased, mortality decline contributes directly to urban population growth in three ways: 1) 
by raising the rate of urban natural increase above zero (allowing an urban population to reproduce 
and expand itself), 2) by increasing demographic pressure in rural areas, and hence spurring 
migration, and 3) by transforming any rural migrants into a source of urban population growth 
instead of mere maintenance.  
 
Although evidence in support of the disease-constraint theory comes primarily in the form of a 
handful of historical case studies, it is compelling enough for Dyson (2010a) to claim that ‘No 
population that has experienced a reduction in its death rate from a high level to a low level has 
failed to urbanize’ (126). In other words, the theory suggests that mortality decline is a necessary 
pre-condition for urbanization and urban growth to occur. Moreover, if some constant net positive 
rate of rural-to-urban migration is assumed, mortality decline followed by rapid population growth 
can also be interpreted as a sufficient condition.  
 
Economic historians provide a complimentary account of the limited scale of urbanization prior to 
the 19th century based on a compelling logical premise: cities can only exist where a surplus of 
energy (i.e. food and fuel) is available to support a large non-agricultural population (Lowry 1990). 
It follows that the size of the urban population in any given region is first and foremost a function 
of the quantity of surplus energy it is able to acquire, which in turn is jointly determined by two 
factors: 1) agricultural productivity and 2) transportation costs (Bairoch 1988).  
 
To appreciate the significance of these basic determinants of urban population size, it is useful to 
consider the role of each at both local and global scales. Historically, the amount of food that could 
be produced in a given region was the primary determinant of the surplus available to support an 
urban population in that region. However, improvements in transport technology eventually made it 
possible to import food from other regions, rendering the potential amount of surplus that urban 
populations could theoretically acquire a dual function of local productivity and transport costs.9 At 
the global level, the state of agricultural productivity at any given time determines the absolute 
amount of surplus available to support the world’s urban population and transport costs determine 
the extent to which surplus can be moved from more-productive to less-productive regions. 
 
The productivity-transport cost framework largely explains the geography of early urban 
settlements, which emerged almost exclusively in areas naturally conducive to surplus food 
production (e.g. fertile river valleys) or locations with naturally low trade costs (i.e. on coasts and 
along rivers) (Childe 1950, Davis 1955, Bairoch 1988). It also explains why the proportion of the 
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 The history of Rome provides a useful illustration of this point. At its peak in 200 AD, the city contained over one 
million residents (including both citizens and slaves)—a population size that far exceeded the total surplus production 
capacity of the Italian peninsula. To satisfy its energy requirements the city was forced to import approximately 75-95% 
of its wheat supplies from distant territorial possessions. Given the state of transportation technology at the time, this 
was an extremely costly means of surplus acquisition and contributed to the financial ruin of the empire. With the 
relocation of the imperial capital to Constantinople in 330 AD and the subsequent collapse of the publically financed 
inter-regional grain distribution system, Rome’s population plummeted to just fifty thousand inhabitants in 700 AD—a 
size much more in line with the productive capacity of its hinterland (see Bairoch 1988 and Reader 2004). 
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world’s urban population remained unchanged for so long. Increasing agricultural output in the pre-
modern era was driven primarily by bringing more land under cultivation rather than by factor 
productivity growth, so although the global urban population may have edged up in absolute terms, 
it could not expand in relative terms.10 Moreover, the potential for regional specialization and 
exchange in agricultural goods was heavily restricted given that transportation costs remained well 
above the threshold that would have made large-scale trade in staple foodstuffs economically 
viable.11  
 
The surplus-constraint logic also addresses a weakness in the disease-constraint hypothesis. 
Substantial variation in the sizes of cities across regions and over time indicates that the 
demographic ‘ceiling’ imposed by disease is a soft one. By contrast, energy availability constitutes 
an absolute constraint. The rise and fall of cities in the pre-industrial era can therefore be 
understood primarily as a reflection of fluctuations in their capacity to acquire surplus energy 
supplies rather than temporal variations in the burden of disease. In other words, the expansion of 
surplus energy supplies is an absolutely necessary condition for urban populations to grow.12 
 
Both the surplus and disease-constraint theories trace the origins of the second phase of world 
urbanization to an explosive confluence of social and technological changes in Northern Europe 
around 1800. Innovations such as nitrogen fertilizer, crop rotation and mechanization drove a surge 
in agricultural productivity (Bairoch 1988, Cameron 1997, Maddison 2007). The harnessing of 
inanimate sources of energy to fuel railroads, steamships and eventually automobiles, led to a 
dramatic reduction in transportation costs (Bairoch 1988, Crafts and Venables 2003). Improvements 
in hygiene, medical knowledge, maternal education, urban planning practices and the expanded 
availability of healthcare sparked a secular decline in mortality rates (Szreter 1997, Bloom and 
Sachs 1999, Reher 2004, Livi-Bacci 2007). Political-institutional changes such as the consolidation 
of private property rights, improved third-party contract enforcement and an expansion of the role 
of governments in the provision of public goods (i.e. healthcare, education and infrastructure) 
served to reinforce and sustain these trends (Szreter 1997, Cameron 1997, Maddison 2007). 
Collectively, these changes catalyzed a permanent shift in Europe from a Malthusian economy 
characterized by stagnant per capita income growth and high mortality to a modern growth regime 
characterized by secular improvements in factor productivity and life expectancy (Galor and Weil 
1999).  
 
Against a backdrop of rising surplus, intensified regional trade and falling mortality, the stage was 
set for European urbanization.13 Between 1800 and 1900, the proportion of Europe’s population 
living in urban settlements nearly tripled (growing from around 10 percent to 30 percent), and by 
the turn of the millennium approximately 70 percent of the region’s population lived in urban areas 
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 Angus Maddison’s historical estimates of world population and GDP indicate that per capita output increased from 
$412 in 1AD to just $606 in 1700 (expressed in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars). From this we can infer that 
factor productivity growth was marginal over this period. In other words, there was very little increase in energy surplus 
per capita.  
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 The bulk of world trade in the pre-industrial era involved relatively lightweight, non-perishable and high-value items 
such as spices and luxury textiles (see Braudel 1984, Bairoch 1988). 
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 Whether or not growth in surplus energy supplies is a sufficient condition for urbanization to occur is a difficult 
question to answer definitively. History suggests that wherever surplus energy becomes available, cities form, 
suggesting that the very presence of the surplus is sufficient to spur migration. This is, however, virtually impossible to 
verify empirically. 
13
 In a cross-country statistical study, Bairoch and Goertz (1986) demonstrated that the pace urbanization in nineteenth-
century Europe was driven primarily by changes in agricultural productivity, by the pace of industrial growth and the 
expansion of trade. However, they found evidence that the most important factors driving urbanization varied over time 
within and between countries.  In particular, their results concerning the role of agricultural productivity were 
ambiguous. In some models the coefficient was positive suggesting that rising output facilitated urbanization, while in 
others the coefficient was negative. They speculate that agricultural success in certain regions resulted in the retention 
rather than release of rural labour.  
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(Bairoch and Goertz 1986; United Nations 2010). Through trade, colonialism and (in the latter half 
of the 20th century) international development assistance, the key technological and institutional 
developments that set Europe’s urban transition in motion were diffused to other regions, 
stimulating urbanization in these regions as well. The onset of the urban transition in any given 
country or region should be therefore be understood as part of a global historical process linked to 
technological and institutional change and diffusion, not simply as a product of endogenous 
economic and demographic forces. 
 
Figure 2 provides a stylized diagram of this historically grounded theory of urbanization. In brief, 
the underlying causes of the urban transition are the advent of technologies and institutions that 
facilitate disease control and surplus energy availability (i.e. productivity growth and reductions in 
transport costs). These factors stimulate mortality decline in both rural and urban areas.14 Mortality 
decline facilitates urban population growth directly by raising the rate of urban natural increase and 
indirectly by raising the rate of rural-urban migration. 
 
Figure 2 Historical theory of urbanization 
 
 
 
Technological and institutional changes also drive economic development, which is understood 
here to be a qualitative change in the structure of output. Economic development exerts a positive 
effect on urbanization and urban growth by further stimulating rural-urban migration as demand for 
labour in non-agricultural sectors expands in urban areas. However, it is a conditioning factor. 
Given that non-economic motivations for migration are ever-present, every country will exhibit net 
positive rates of urbanization so long as mortality rates continue to fall and surplus energy supplies 
keep pace with urban population growth.15  
 
The fact that many of the technological and institutional changes that drive mortality decline and 
facilitate surplus expansion also drive economic development is the source of the spurious 
conclusion that urbanization is fundamentally a by-product of economic development. These two 
processes can become decoupled—as in the African case, to which we now turn. First, the timing of 
Africa’s urban transition is explained with reference to geographical characteristics of the region 
and the influence of European colonialism. Second, the unique characteristics of African 
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 Surplus food expansion contributes to mortality decline through improved nutrition, which is an important 
determinant of variation in disease-related morbidity and mortality rates. 
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 Urbanization is, of course, a finite process. Therefore the rate of urbanization is naturally decreasing with its level. By 
contrast, there is technically no upper bound on urban growth. This explains continued urban growth in some fully 
urbanized countries such as many in South America, which continue to experience fertility rates that exceed the 
replacement rate of 2.1.  
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urbanization in the postcolonial era (i.e. urbanization without growth and exceptionally high urban 
population growth rates) are explained by a combination of demographic forces, historically unique 
political dynamics associated with decolonisation, and economic trends. 
 
 
Geography, colonialism and early urbanization in Africa 
Archaeological evidence and oral histories confirm the presence of urban settlements in sub-
Saharan Africa for over 2000 years (Anderson and Rathbone 2000). However, these settlements 
remained relatively small, few and far between in comparison to other regions of the world, and 
most proved ephemeral. As Figure 3 demonstrates, it was not until the middle of the 20th century 
that Africa’s urban transition got underway. 
 
Figure 3 Levels of urbanization by major world region, 1850-2050 
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Sources: Grauman (1977) and United Nations (2009) 
 
Drawing on the surplus/disease constraint theory outlined above, the late onset of Africa’s urban 
transition can largely been explained by natural geographical endowments. Africa’s climate, soils, 
topography and disease ecology represent considerable obstacles to surplus agricultural production; 
a large land area-to-coastline ratio, few navigable rivers and low population densities are significant 
natural barriers to trade, contributing to exceptionally high transportation costs in the region (even 
today) and limited scope for specialization and innovation; and climatic and ecological 
characteristics render Africa uniquely conducive to infectious and parasitic diseases, the 
consequences of which are evidenced by the fact that sub-Saharan Africa has consistently suffered 
the highest mortality rates in the world since comparable records became available in the 1950s (see 
Diamond 1998, Bloom and Sachs 1999, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, Iliffe 2007). In 
other words, the region has historically faced extensive surplus and disease constraints due to its 
natural geographic endowments. 
 
Despite the profound technological and institutional changes that have spurred urban transitions 
across the world over the past two centuries, it is still possible to detect the influence of 
geographical endowments on the differential timing of urbanization across countries and regions. 
As noted above, access to surplus food supplies was a key constraint on early urbanization. Prior to 
the advent of production and transport technologies that facilitated the boom in surplus food 
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production and exchange that began in the 18th century, the two factors that determined a particular 
settlement’s access to surplus was the agricultural potential of the surrounding region area and 
transportation costs. We can therefore hypothesise that countries with greater agricultural potential 
and naturally lower transportation costs began urbanising earlier than those with limited agricultural 
potential and higher trade costs.  
 
This hypothesis can be simply tested using cross-country regression analysis in which a country’s 
level of urbanization and urban population size in 1960 are modelled as a function of relatively 
time-invariant geographical characteristics that influence agricultural productivity and 
transportation costs: soil quality (measured as the percentage of a country’s land area that has soils 
that are very or moderately suitable for six key rain-fed crops), length of coastline in kilometres and 
total length of navigable waterways in kilometres. Table 2 presents the results of such an analysis 
based on a sample of 126 countries for which data are available. A control for GDP per capita in 
1960 is included to capture the inevitable mediating effects of technological and institutional 
changes prior to 1960 on natural geographical constraints. In the second specification, in which the 
dependent variable is the total size of the urban population (as opposed to the ratio of urban to 
rural), an added control for national population size is included due to the natural correlation 
between total population and urban population size (Davis and Henderson 2003). Full details of all 
variables and sources can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Table 2 Geography & urbanization in 1960 
 
 
Level of 
Urbanization 
Urban 
population 
Coastline (km) .051*** 
(.015) 
.055** 
(.016) 
Waterways (km) .029** 
(.012) 
.035** 
(.014) 
Soil potential .330*** 
(.110) 
.342*** 
(.111) 
GDP per capita, 
1960 
.700*** 
(.048) 
.691*** 
(.050) 
National population  .973*** 
(.035) 
R-squared .734 .941 
Observations 126 126 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are indicated by ***, **, * 
respectively. 
 
 
The results confirm that countries with better soil quality and more extensive ‘natural’ 
transportation infrastructure were both more urbanized and had larger overall urban populations in 
1960 than countries that were less favourably endowed, as expected. Given Africa’s poor 
endowments in terms of surplus production potential, the late onset of urbanization in the region is 
explicable. Ideally, this ‘endowment’ model would also account for differential disease ecologies 
across countries. Unfortunately, a dearth of such data from the pre-1800 era renders this impossible. 
It is likely that the inclusion of such information would improve the explanatory power of the 
model. 
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The alleviation of geographical constraints on urbanization in Africa began in the colonial era. In 
the early colonial period the slave trade, violence, the introduction of foreign pathogens and the 
disruption of traditional systems of production and networks of trade contributed to a shrinking of 
Africa’s population. However, after World War I (WWI) European powers began to invest more 
heavily in primary commodity production, launched health campaigns to combat epidemic diseases, 
expanded transport infrastructure and introduced new agricultural technologies and cultigens such 
as cassava, which is drought resistant and has become an important anti-famine crop across Africa 
(Iliffe 2007, Clapham 2006). While these changes collectively improved access to surplus and 
stimulated a secular decline in mortality rates in the region, urbanization remained limited between 
WWI and World War II due to colonial restrictions on African mobility and residence in urban 
areas, poor living conditions in urban areas and limited waged employment opportunities.  
 
After WWII colonial powers (especially Britain and France) changed tack and launched a 
‘modernization’ drive designed to prepare colonies for eventual independence. This involved 
significant expansion of public education and health services, further infrastructure development 
and some (limited) industrial investments (Cooper 2002, Iliffe 2007). Vaccination schemes led to a 
sharp reduction in mortality associated with epidemic diseases, child mortality rates began to fall 
due to better treatments for afflictions such as polio, measles, diarrhoea and malnutrition, and 
improved road and rail transport contributed to reductions in famine related mortality by rendering 
affected areas more accessible to emergency aid (Iliffe 2007). As mortality rates fell, Africa’s 
population began to grow rapidly. With the gradual relaxation of restrictions on African mobility 
coupled with higher demand for labour in urban areas during and immediately after World War II, 
there was a region wide surge in rural-to-urban migration, which exacerbated poor housing 
conditions and drove consumer price inflation and unemployment—issues that proved instrumental 
in catalyzing the growth of the union movement, which played a pivotal role in securing 
independence in the region (Cooper 2002, Iliffe 2007). 
 
In sum, Africa’s urban transition was set in motion by technologies and institutions introduced in 
the late colonial period that facilitated a population boom in the region. However, the nature and 
impact of colonialism varied widely across countries within the region, and this variation provides a 
means of assessing the relative impact of colonialism on urbanization trends. We can hypothesise 
that those countries in which colonial powers were more economically and politically active 
experienced higher degrees of technological and institutional transfer and diffusion, thereby 
creating more favourable conditions for urbanization and urban growth. To test this hypothesis we 
can use three separate indicators of colonial influence: relative colonial investment, an indicator of 
relative direct vs. indirect rule derived from legal records, and an indicator of colonial 
administrative depth.  
 
Figures 4 and 5 present evidence that variation in levels of colonial capital investment in African 
territories is correlated with variation in early urbanization in the region. In both figures the X-axis 
represents the total amount of publically listed capital investments in European colonial territories 
between 1870 and 1936, as catalogued by Frankel (1969). In Figure 4, the Y-axis represents the 
relative size of the urban population for the corresponding territory in 1950; in Figure 5 the Y-axis 
represents the proportion of the territory’s population living in urban areas in 1950 (the earliest date 
for which comparable figures are available). Despite the fact that only twenty observations are 
available, there is a clear correlation between early colonial investment and early urbanization in the 
region.16 
                                                 
16
 The direction of causality assumed in Figure 4 could be challenged by the argument that colonisers invested more 
where there were larger African populations (and hence a larger pool of labour to exploit). Given that total population 
and urban population are highly correlated, this is a potentially valid criticism. However, given the paucity of pre-
colonial urban settlements in the region, it is unlikely that colonizers invested in areas with existing urban populations, 
so the assumed causal link between colonial investment and urban population size is reasonable. Moreover, total 
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Figure 4 Colonial investment & urban population size in 1950 
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Figure 5 Colonial investment & level of urbanization in 1950 
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Notes for Figures 4 & 5: Colonial investment data is from Frankel (1969); population estimates are drawn 
from United Nations (2010). I have used only Frankel’s estimates of publically listed capital investments for 
20 colonial territories. As the boundaries of these territories do not correspond to the contemporary national 
boundaries used in UN population statistics I aggregated population data for all countries that correspond to 
Frankel’s regions. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
population and levels of urbanization are not at all correlated. Consequently the assumed direction of causality in Figure 
5 is robust to this challenge. In results not reported here, Frankel’s colonial investment figures were also found to be 
negatively correlated with crude death rates in 1950 and positively correlated with income per capita in 1950, consistent 
with the hypothesis that colonial investment had the dual effect of reducing mortality and improving access to surplus 
food supplies. 
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More nuanced evidence of colonial influence can be identified using regression analysis, the results 
of which are presented in Table 3. In the upper half of the table, the independent variable is a 
measure of relative ‘indirect rule’ in 33 former British colonies developed by Lange (2004). The 
indirect rule index represents the percentage of legal settled by ‘traditional’ authorities (as opposed 
to formal courts) in 1955. The higher this percentage, the more British authorities were relying on 
local power brokers to maintain order in their territories. As Lange (2004) has demonstrated, higher 
degrees of colonial indirect rule resulted in less effective public institutions in the postcolonial 
period. In the lower half of the table, the independent variable is the number of colonial civil 
servants per capita in British and French colonial territories in Africa circa 1936, as calculated by 
Richens (2009). This serves as a proxy for administrative depth. As with capital investment, it is 
reasonable to suppose that higher degrees of direct political rule and administrative depth resulted 
in greater technological and institutional transfer and diffusion, and hence more favourable 
conditions for early urbanization and urban growth. 
 
The dependent variables in Table 3 include a range of measures associated with disease control and 
access to surplus. These include the infant mortality rate in 1960 (a proxy for disease burden), food 
supply in 1960 (measured in calories per capita per day), the number of registered physicians per 
1000 population around 1960, the average annual rate of change in the infant mortality rate in the 
15 years after 1960, the level of urbanization in 1960 and total urban population in 1960. 
 
Table 3 Colonial origins of variation in early urbanization & urban growth 
 
 IMR 
1960 
Calories 
per capita 
Physician
s per 
1000 
∆ IMR 
1960-
1975 
Urbanizat
ion, 1960 
Urban 
population
, 1960 
 Former British colonies 
Indirect rule .012*** 
(.002) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
-.023*** 
(.004) 
.026*** 
(.007) 
-.019*** 
(.004) 
-.022*** 
(.005) 
Population      1.091*** 
(.073) 
R-squared .654 .259 .576 .299 .429 .889 
Observations 33 31 33 33 33 33 
       
 Former African colonies 
Col. Civ. 
Serv. 
-.088* 
(.044) 
.090*** 
(.029) 
.690*** 
(.177) 
-.458*** 
(.140) 
.376** 
(.181) 
.429** 
(.187) 
Population      1.137*** 
(.129) 
R-squared .120 .252 .352 .269 .130 .735 
Observations 31 31 30 31 31 31 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are 
indicated by ***, **, * respectively. 
 
 
The results indicate that higher degrees of indirect rule are associated with higher infant mortality, 
lesser food surplus and fewer physicians per capita in 1960, while greater administrative depth is 
associated with lower infant mortality rates, greater food surplus and more physicians per capita in 
1960. The direction of causality in these correlations is not necessarily clear. As Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001) have argued, patterns of colonial settlement may have been 
influenced by the disease environment and agricultural potential of a region, so these correlations 
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could be interpreted as suffering from reverse causality. In other words, colonizers may have 
invested economically and politically in territories with lower disease burdens and greater 
agricultural potential.  
 
However, there is no theoretical reason to believe that mortality decline in the independence period 
was driven by anything other than the further diffusion of technologies and the consolidation of 
institutions introduced during the colonial period that affect public health. As column 4 shows, 
African countries that had more robust colonial legal institutions and greater colonial administrative 
capacity experienced more rapid declines in infant mortality in the early postcolonial period than 
those that experienced less colonial institutional and administrative investment. In this case the 
direction of causality is clear: postcolonial changes in mortality cannot logically have driven 
colonial settlement patterns. Finally, columns 5 and 6 confirm the association demonstrated above 
between colonial capital investment and early urbanization: the indirect rule and administrative 
depth indicators are both significantly correlated with both the size and percentage of a countries 
urban population in 1960. 
 
While no single piece of this statistical mosaic provides definitive confirmation that urbanization in 
African was historically inhibited by unfavourable geographic endowments and ultimately set in 
motion by technologies and institutions introduced by European colonizers, collectively the 
evidence provides significant support for these arguments founded on the surplus/disease constraint 
theory outlined above. 
 
 
Urbanization and urban growth in the post-colonial era 
The surge in urban populations that began in the late colonial period accelerated in the 
independence era due to a confluence of demographic, political and economic factors. The mortality 
decline that began in the late colonial era continued while fertility rates remained exceptionally high 
resulting in a population boom of historically unprecedented scale.17 There was a sharp increase in  
                                                 
17
 The unprecedented lag between mortality decline and fertility decline is usually explained as a consequence of 
historical factors that have rendered high birth rates culturally desirable in the region (see Iliffe 2007 and Clapham 
2009). 
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urban employment opportunities due to the expansion and Africanization of civil service 
administrations, investments in public works and an industrialization drive largely financed through 
international development assistance (Miner 1967, Stren and Halfani 2001, Iliffe 2007). And 
economic growth rates in the region reached historic highs in this era, fuelled by public and private 
investment and strong growth in commodity exports. As a result, rates of urbanization and urban 
population growth reached exceptional heights between 1960 and 1975 (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 Demographic & economic trends in Africa 
 
 
1960-
1975 
1975-
1990 
1990-
2005 
Urban population growth 5.09 4.64 4.06 
Rate of urbanization 2.52 1.78 1.45 
GDP per capita growth 2.03 -0.61 0.36 
Population growth 2.56 2.86 2.60 
Notes: Calculated based on data from World Bank World 
Development Indicators Database, accessed September, 2010. GDP 
growth rate estimates based on real GDP per capita (constant 2000 
$US) 
 
 
However, unsustainable fiscal expansion, poor macroeconomic management, deteriorating terms of 
trade and a global recession following the 1973 oil price shock resulted in a region-wide economic 
crisis. By the early 1980s sub-Saharan Africa was experiencing negative per capita income growth 
and fiscal retrenchment in the form of donor-imposed structural adjustment programmes. The 
consequences were severe in urban areas. Public and private sector employment contracted sharply, 
real wages declined, investments in housing and urban infrastructure came to a virtual standstill and 
the yawning rural-urban wage gap that arose in the early independence era essentially vanished 
(Potts 1995, Weeks 1995, Becker and Morrison 1995). Yet urbanization and urban growth rates 
remained generally high in the region, with a few notable exceptions. This can be explained by 
continued mortality decline, which sustained high rates of population growth, and steady surplus 
expansion sustained by imports and aid. As Figure 6 shows, surplus food supplies (measured as 
tons per capita of cereals and starchy roots) generally kept pace with urban population growth, even 
in the crisis years of the 1980s and early 1990s. It also shows that this growth was made possible by 
imports more than productivity growth.  
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Figure 6 Urban population growth & food supply in Africa, 1961-2000 
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Notes: Food supply data are from FAOSTAT online database, accessed June 2010. Population figures 
are from the United Nations. Production and import data refer only to cereals (excluding beer) and 
starchy roots. 
 
 
Perhaps the most well-known exception to this narrative is the case of Zambia in the 1990s; one of 
the few countries to experience an episode of de-urbanization in the modern era. This is generally 
attributed to a severe economic crisis and the effects of structural adjustment on urban employment 
and incomes (Potts 1995), yet many other countries experienced similar crises without de-
urbanization. However, Zambia also experienced a sharp decline in food supplies beginning in the 
1980s and a reversal in the trend of declining mortality in the early 1990s, likely due to rising urban 
poverty and exceptionally high HIV prevalence rates in urban areas (Dyson 2003). As Figure 7 
demonstrates, these trends map directly onto Zambia’s episode of de-urbanization. Economic crisis 
and public sector retrenchment surely contributed indirectly to surplus contraction and rising 
mortality, but the actual cause of Zambian de-urbanization was a resurgence of surplus and disease 
constraints. 
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Figure 7 The case of de-urbanization in Zambia 
 
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Percentage urban (left axis)
Crude death rate (deaths per 1,000 population, left axis)
Food supply (tonnes per capita, right axis)
 
 
Notes: Food supply data are from FAOSTAT online database, accessed June 2010. Population 
and mortality figures are from the United Nations. Food supply data refer only to cereals 
(excluding beer) and starchy roots. 
 
 
In sum, Africa’s urban transition in the early postcolonial period was driven by a combination of 
rapid population growth set in motion in the late colonial period, a postcolonial ‘adjustment’ 
involving the Africanization and expansion of employment opportunities in urban areas, and an 
early investment drive. It was sustained through the recessionary years of 1975-1990 and the slow-
growth recovery years of the 1990s by persistent demographic expansion. In other words, 
urbanization without growth and exceptionally high urban growth rates in the late twentieth century 
are both explicable once Africa’s post-war political and population dynamics are taken into 
account. 
 
As a test of this argument, Table 5 presents the results of an OLS regression analysis in which 
average annual rates of urbanization and urban growth are modelled as a function of a) average 
annual rates of population growth, b) average annual rates of per capita income growth, and c) the 
sectoral composition of output, measured as the average percentage of agriculture value-added in 
GDP over the relevant period. According to the theory outlined above, population growth and 
economic growth rates should both be positively correlated with rates of urbanization and urban 
growth while agriculture as a percentage of GDP should be negatively correlated (as a result of 
labour being retained in the rural sector). The model also incorporates a dummy variable for sub-
Saharan African countries to determine whether or not African countries share some unobserved 
characteristics that account for persistent urbanization in the absence of economic growth and 
exceptionally high urban population growth rates.  
 
The data consist of an unbalanced panel dataset with 353 observations from over 150 countries 
spanning three 15 year intervals that roughly correspond to global economic trends (1960-1975, 
1975-1990 and 1990-2005) in order to limit the influence of short-term fluctuations in economic 
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and demographic conditions. This arrangement also permits the inclusion of two more control 
variables: interactive regional dummies to determine whether there was a significant post-colonial 
adjustment effect (Fay and Opal 2000). These are AFRICA*P1 covering the 1960-75 period and 
AFRICA*P2 covering the 1975-90 period. Finally, as per convention, the initial level of 
urbanization in each period is controlled for. 
 
Table 5 Determinants of urbanization & urban growth rates 
 
 
Urbanization 
rate 
Urban growth 
rate 
Population growth .151*** 
(.042) 
1.151*** 
(.042) 
Per capita GDP 
growth 
.125*** 
(.024) 
.125*** 
(.024) 
Agriculture (% of 
GDP) 
-.016*** 
(.005) 
-.016*** 
(.005) 
AFRICA .143 
(.190) 
.142 
(.190) 
AFRICA*P1 1.154*** 
(.260) 
1.155*** 
(.260) 
AFRICA*P2 .598** 
(.233) 
.599*** 
(.233) 
Urbanization
 t1 -1.296*** (.127) 
-1.296*** 
(.127) 
R-squared .602 .827 
Observations 353 353 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels are indicated by ***, **, * respectively. 
 
 
As expected, population growth and GDP growth are both positively and significantly correlated 
with urbanization and urban growth rates while agriculture is negatively and significantly 
correlated. The Africa dummy is insignificant, however the period interaction dummys are both 
positive and significant. The fact that the AFRICA*P1 coefficient is both larger in magnitude and 
more statistically significant than the AFRICA*P2 dummy is suggestive of a post-colonial 
adjustment effect that abated with time—consistent with the historical narrative presented above. 
There is little reason to suspect reverse causality in this model, given that higher levels of 
urbanization are generally associated with lower fertility rates and hence lower population growth 
rates. Consequently, if rates of urbanization were having an effect on urbanization and urban 
growth rates, it would most likely be a negative effect. Similarly, there is no evidence that levels of 
urbanization affect GDP growth rates (Bloom, Canning and Fink 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, a second test examining the determinants of level changes in urbanization and urban 
population size serves as a robustness check. In this case, we examine whether or not the 
independent variables of interest add predictive power to a model that includes lagged values of the 
dependent variable as an independent variable. This approach follows the logic (although not the 
exact form) of a ‘Granger causality test’ (see Granger 1969 and Bloom, Canning and Fink 2008). A 
variable X can be said to ‘Granger-cause’ Y if Xt-1 explains variation in Yt when Yt-1 is included as a 
control variable in the equation. In this case, we examine whether or not our independent variables 
of interest help to predict levels of urbanization and urban population size at time t2 when levels of 
urbanization and urban population size in t1 are controlled for. The results of this test are presented 
in Table 6. 
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Table 6 Determinants of changes in relative & absolute size of urban populations 
 
 
Level of 
urbanizationt2 
Urban 
population
 t2 
Population growth .023*** 
(.006) 
.142*** 
(.007) 
Per capita GDP 
growth 
.019*** 
(.004) 
.019*** 
(.004) 
Agriculture (% of 
GDP) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
AFRICA .021 
(.029) 
.016 
(.029) 
AFRICA*P1 .173*** 
(.039) 
.163*** 
(.039) 
AFRICA*P2 .090** 
(.035) 
.086** 
(.035) 
Urbanizationt1 .806*** (.019) 
 
Urban population
 t1  .804*** (.019) 
National population
 t2  .188*** (.020) 
R-squared .944 .992 
Observations 353 353 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at the 
1, 5 and 10 percent levels are indicated by ***, **, * 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Again, the results are consistent with the hypotheses: population growth and economic growth 
continue to exhibit a positive and significant effect on levels of urbanization and urban population 
size while the share of agriculture in GDP remains negative. There is also no evidence of an 
‘Africa’ effect, but significant evidence of a post-colonial adjustment effect as captured by the two 
interaction dummys. Moreover, these results can be interpreted as providing strong evidence of a 
causal relationship between our independent and dependent variables: levels of urbanization and 
urban population size at time t2 cannot logically have influenced rates of urbanization or GDP 
growth in the previous 15-year period. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Urbanization should be viewed as a global historical process set in motion by technological and 
institutional changes which alleviated the surplus and disease constraints that limited population 
growth in the pre-industrial era. These changes initially emerged in Europe and subsequently 
spread, albeit unevenly, through conquest and trade. This historically grounded theory of 
urbanization stands in contrast to the traditional view that urbanization is essentially a by-product of 
industrialisation. While it is true that mortality decline and expanded access to surplus food 
supplies—pre-requisites for urbanization—often go hand-in-hand with economic development, they 
do not always do so.  
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In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, colonizers introduced key technological and institutional 
innovations and facilitated economic integration between Africa and the rest of the world, thereby 
alleviating the geographically determined surplus and disease constraints that had prevented 
urbanization from occurring earlier in the region. However, colonial influence varied significantly 
across countries within the region, and this variation accounts for a significant fraction of variation 
in early urbanization across countries.  
 
In the post-WWII era, significant gains in life expectancy and increased access to surplus food 
supplies progressed more rapidly than economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, 
many countries in the region experienced urbanization without growth. Moreover, rapid mortality 
decline coupled with minimal fertility decline has created a population boom of historically 
unprecedented proportions—a population boom that largely accounts for extraordinary urban 
growth rates in the region.  
 
There is, in sum, nothing particularly unusual about Africa’s urban transition when viewed through 
the lens of the historical theory of urbanization outlined here. The implications of this theory, from 
a practical policy perspective, is that the process of urbanization cannot restrained without 
implementing draconian mobility restrictions or permitting disease and hunger to re-surface in 
urban areas. For governments concerned with easing demographic pressure in urban areas, the only 
humane policy option is one targeted at encouraging fertility decline in order to reduce population 
growth rates. While fertility decline is a natural consequence of urbanization, interventions such as 
family planning initiatives may serve to accelerate the process and ease the strains associated with 
rapid urban population growth in the region. 
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Appendix A 
 
Variable Description Source 
Level of 
urbanization 
Percentage of national 
population residing in 
urban areas 
United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: the 2009 Revision (2010) 
Urban 
population 
Absolute size of a 
country’s urban 
population in 1000’s 
United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: the 2009 Revision (2010) 
National 
population 
Absolute size of a 
country’s population 
in 1000’s 
United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: the 2009 Revision (2010) 
World 
population 
(Fig. 1) 
Population in millions 
Maddison, Angus (2009) Historical statistics: 
World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-
2003 AD (March 2009). Available online at: 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/  
Historical 
urbanization 
estimates 
(Fig. 1 & 3) 
Percentage of world 
population residing in 
urban areas 
Grauman, John V. (1977) ‘Orders of magnitude 
of the world’s urban population in history’, 
Population Bulletin of the United Nations No.8 
-1976, New York: United Nations. 
Coastline 
(km) 
Log of kilometres of 
coastline CIA World Factbook (various years) 
Waterways 
(km) 
Log of navigable 
waterways CIA World Factbook (various years) 
Soil potential 
Percentage of land 
area with soil very or 
moderately suitable for 
6 key rainfed crops 
Gallup, John L. and Jeffrey D. Sachs, with 
Andrew Mellinger,"Geography and Economic 
Development" (CID Working PaperNo. 1, 
March 1999). Available at: 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html 
GDP per 
capita 
Real GDP per capita in 
1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars 
Maddison, Angus (2009) Historical statistics: 
World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-
2003 AD (March 2009). Available online at: 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/  
Colonial 
investment, 
1870-1936 
Sum of publically 
listed capital invested 
in African colonial 
territories between 
1870 and 1936, 
calculated in pounds 
sterling  
Frankel, S. Herbert (1969) Capital Investment in 
Africa: Its Course and Effects, New York: 
Howard Fertig 
Indirect rule 
Percentage of legal 
cases adjudicated by 
‘traditional’ authorities 
in British colonies, 
1955 
Lange, Matthew K. (2004) 'British Colonial 
Legacies and Political Development', World 
Development, Vol. 32, No. 6: 905-922 
Col. Civ. 
Serv. 
Colonial civil servants 
per capita in African 
territories c. 1936 
Richens, Peter (2009) 'The Economic Legacies 
of the 'Thin White Line': Indirect Rule and the 
Comparative Development of Sub-Saharan 
Africa', Economic History Working Paper No. 
131, London School of Economics & Political 
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Science. 
IMR 1960 Infant mortality rate in 1960 
United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision (2009) 
Calories per 
capita 
Average available 
calories per capita per 
day in 1960 
Food and Agricultural organization, available at 
http://faostat.fao.org 
Physicians 
per 1000 
Physicians per 1000 
population around 
1960. Missing values 
were replaced by 
nearest available year 
World Bank World Development Indicators 
online, accessed June 2011. Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators 
∆IMR 1960-
1975 
Average annual rate of 
change in infant 
mortality rate between 
1960 and 1975 
Author calculations based on data from United 
Nations Population Division, World Population 
Prospects: the 2008 Revision (2009) 
Food 
production & 
imports (Fig. 
6) 
Production and import 
volume of cereals 
(excluding beer) and 
starchy roots in tonnes 
Food and Agricultural organization, FAOSTAT 
database. Available at http://faostat.fao.org 
Food supply 
(Fig. 7) 
Available tonnes per 
capita of cereals and 
starchy roots 
Food and Agricultural organization, FAOSTAT 
database. Available at http://faostat.fao.org 
Crude death 
rate (Fig. 7) 
Deaths per 1000 
population 
United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision (2009) 
Agriculture 
(% of GDP) 
Average of agriculture 
value-added as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Calculated for three 
15-year periods: 1960-
1975, 1975-1990, 
1990-2005 
World Bank World Development Indicators 
online, accessed June 2011. Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators 
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